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Wise: Is Dennis Really a Menace?

IS DENNIS REALLY A MENACE?
RAYMOND L. WIsE*

Are the Dennis and subsequent cases, really a menace to the first
amendment 2 to the Constitution of the United States?
Until a little over a decade ago, it was generally held that the first
amendment clearly prohibited Congress from "abridging freedom of
speech." But in 1951, in Dennis v. United States,3 the Court, for the
4
first time, in a matter dealing with a conviction under the Smith Act,
announced the "balancing of rights" doctrine, under which it is held
that Congress can decide, on a reasonable basis, when the proscriptions
of the first amendment shall be subordinated to the requirements of
national security.
Two primary factors caused this retreat from first amendment absolutism:
-A.B. 1916, LL.B. 1919, Columbia University; member of New York and Miami,
Florida, bars.
1. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
203 (1961); Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,
567 U.S. 1 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
3. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
4. Sections 2 and 3 of the Smith Act, 54 Stat. 671, 18 U.S.C. §§10, 11 (1946) (see
18 U.S.C. §2385 (1958)), provide as follows:
"Sec. 2. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person- (1) to knowingly or willfully
advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of
overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or
violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government; (2) with
intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any government in the United
States, to print, publish, edit, issue, circulate, sell, distribute, or publicly display
any written or printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity,
desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the
United States by force or violence; (3) to organize or help to organize any society,
group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow
or destruction of any government in the United States by force or by violence; or
to be or become a member of, or affiliate with, any such society, group, or assembly
of persons, knowing the purposes thereof. (b) For the purposes of this section,
the term 'government in the United States' means the Government of the United
States, the government of any State, Territory, or possession of the United States,
the government of the District of Columbia, or the government of any political
sub-division of any of them.
"Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for any person to attempt to commit, or to conspire to commit, any of the acts prohibited by the provisions of ...this title."

[869]
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(1) For the first time in our history we have a number of American citizens and residents, variously estimated from 20,000 to 100,000,
who profess a higher allegiance to a foreign power and its political
and economic theories than to the United States; and
(2) For the first time in our history we can be attacked disastrously in less than an hour by missiles launched by that same militarily potent foreign power, waging nuclear war.
Finley Peter Dunn's "Misther Dooley" used to say "The Supreme
Court follies the illiction returns." Were he alive today Mr. Dooley
might well amend his famous dictum to some appropriately Hibernian
expression in respect to the fact that the Supreme Court also follows
the hard realities of history and the brutal facts of power politics.
THE DANGER TEST -

SCHENCK

To

DENNIS

5

The freedom of speech in the first amendment is not absolute;
libel, slander, obscenity, contempt of court, incitement to riot, and
seditious utterances are punishable. In two early cases 6 the power
of Congress and of a state legislature to declare specified words punishable went unquestioned and was routinely upheld. The question
whether speech is punishable has arisen most often in cases in which
the language allegedly has a tendency to incite to other offenses, most
often seditious conduct. In this area two constitutional principles
clash, that of freedom of expression and that of the right to protect
the public safety or the national security.
The most famous judicial scalpel for separating these often conflicting rights was forged by Mr. Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United
States.7 In 1919, he initiated the "clear and present danger" test" to
determine whether utterances of a Socialist were punishable as attempting to impede recruiting in World War I. Although not
spelled out by the court in those terms, the test would appear to be
no more than an aspect of the definition of attempt in criminal lawY

5.

See Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger - From Schenck to Dennis, 52
L. REv. 313 (1952), for a more complete analysis of the danger test during

COLUm.

this period.
6. Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).

7. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
8. "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree." Id. at 52. It was in this case
that Mr. Justice Holmes also pointed out that there is no legal right to yell "firel"
in a crowded theater.
9. The writer has never seen this theory advanced elsewhere. It is included
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In that field, if an act comes reasonably near effecting the commission
of the crime intended the defendant is charged with "attempt." The
"clear and present danger" test is, in effect, an application of these
principles to freedom of expression. If the words are used, says Mr.
Justice Holmes, "in such circumstances, and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger" [that is, to come reasonably near]
of bringing about "the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent," they are punishable. "It is a question of proximity and
degree." From its announcement in Schenck to its near annihilation
by misapplications culminating in Dennis, the "dear and present
danger" test has meant various things to members of the Court, not
always what Mr. Justice Holmes intended.
In 1919 and 1920, the Court affirmed five convictions involving
interference with our war aims in which Schenck was cited without
mention of the danger test.20 Again in 1925, in Gitlow v. New
York," the Court rejected the danger test and sustained a statute
making it criminal to advocate the overthrow of government by force
2
a criminal syndiand violence. In 1927, in Whitney v. California1
calism statute was upheld as a reasonable infringement on free speech
without resort to the danger test. During this period the danger
test was nurtured by Justices Holmes and Brandeis in concurring and
dissenting opinions.' 3 They maintained that "If there be time to
expose through discussion the falsehoods and fallacies, to avert the
evil by processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more
speech, not enforced silence."' 4
The cases in the 1930's followed no doctrinal pattern; and despite
a flood of civil rights cases the danger test was mentioned only
twice. 15 Through this chain of precedents the right of free speech was
propelled to a position approaching absolutism.
From 1940 to 1951, the danger test was applied in a variety of
situations and discarded in others seemingly similar. It never became
a firm rule of law, but its potential impact in any case involving
for what little value it may have.
10. Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920); Schaefer v. United States, 251
U.S. 466 (1920); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs. v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
11. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
12. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
13. The dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes in Abrams, supra note 10, at 630, is
particularly notable. He would uphold the constitutional "experiment" of allowing expression of "opinions that we loathe" unless they "imminently threaten
immediate interference" with order. In Gitlow, supra note 10, he argued eloquently
for a free market place for ideas in which truth would ultimately prevail.
14. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927).
15. In Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937), the danger test was used to
backstop the Court's reversal of a conviction for alleged insurrection. In Herndon
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"freedom of speech" had to be considered. When used in this period,
the danger test limited public rights and filled the areas thus created
with permissible speech.
Starting in 1940, five anti-picketing statutes were held unconstitutional because they outlawed a mode of expression that presented
no "clear and present danger."1 6 Also in 1940, "prior restraint" was
used to invalidate legislation, which was also susceptible to the
danger test.' 7 Further in 1940, requiring school children in the
public schools to salute the flag was found to be a reasonable exercise
of legislative judgment.' However, dissatisfaction with the reasonable basis approach in the early 1940's led to reversal of the flag salute case' 9 and a corresponding expansion of the use of the danger
test. The danger test was used primarily to invalidate legislation and
reverse convictions.20 Other doctrines were occasionally used when
a contrary result was desired, although the minority continued to
couch their dissents in danger language. 2 1 The Court required the
danger to be "imminent" before limiting speech. The "clear and present danger" doctrine became a "catch-all" to test the validity of legislation as well as its scope, a use probably not contemplated by Mr. Justice Holmes. These cases, for the most part, comprise the rise and
fall of the doctrine. Applied indiscriminately, the danger test became
detached from its foundations. However, the net effect, at this time,
was to place the first amendment above competing Constitutional
rights.
Beginning about 1950, a change was noticeable. In American
v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441

(1935), Mr. Justice Cardozo used danger language in

his concurring opinion. Several cases reversed convictions as prior restraints on
freedom of speech. E.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
16. Baker & Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); Hotel & Restaurant
Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 437 (1942); AFL v.
Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941); Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (19,10); Thornhill

v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
17. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
18. Minerville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
19.

West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).

20. E.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (reversed conviction for
speech that induced a breach of the peace); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947)
(newspaper contempt citations reversed); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946),
in which Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, foreshadowed his opinion in Dennis;
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 576 (1945) (statute requiring registration of labor
organizers unconstitutional as applied). The cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses,
e.g., Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943), reversed convictions primarily on prior
restraint grounds, as did Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), involving a
sound truck.
21. E.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). The Court seems to have taken the reasonable
basis approach in these cases.
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Communications Ass'n v. Douds,22 a case requiring officials of labor
organizations to sign non-communist affidavits, the respective rights
were "balanced" in favor of public order. In another case the danger
23
test was used to sustain a conviction for the first time in thirty years.
The cases decided prior to Dennis dealt with interference with
the armed forces, Jehovah's Witnesses, labor leaders, contempt citations, inept state attempts to prevent sedition, polygamy, and race
hatred. Whenever the position of the defendant was upheld, the
emphasis was on the importance of freedom of expression rather than
on whether harm was done to society. The cases striking down
statutes gave a preferred position to the first amendment.
No case applying the Holmes doctrine involved the avowed aim
of Marxists to communize the whole world by force and violence if
necessary. A realistic analysis of these cases would not require clairvoyance to predict a reversion to the Gitlow24 doctrine, that a state
can protect itself by prohibiting specific language if deemed necessary
for internal security, when the Court was faced with the brutal facts
of the contemporary uneasy balance of international power as it was
in the Dennis case.
THE DENNIS CASE

In 1949, a number of national officials of the Communist Party
were convicted of conspiring to organize the Communist Party of the
United States as a group to teach and advocate the violent overthrow
of the Government of the United States with intent to do so. On
appeal the Second Circuit affirmed. 25 Chief Judge Learned Hand,
interpreting the danger test to fit the situation, found that "the
gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."28 On
certiorari, Mr. Chief Justice Vinson writing for the Court states: "We
adopt this statement of the rule."2 7 The opinion concludes that in
view of the inflammable nature of world conditions, "it is the exis22. 339 U.S. 382 (1950). The Association sued Douds as director of the National
Labor Relations Board to restrain the holding of an election. The Court held,
by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, that the requirement that officers of labor organizations must file affidavits that they do not belong to the Communist Party and do
not believe in the overthrow of the Government by force and violence does not violate the Bill of Rights. The doctrine of balancing the rights of "public order" and
"partial abridgment of speech" is relied on. Id. at 399. Unlike Dennis, however the
"balancing" is held to be a duty of the courts.
23. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
24. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
25. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950).
26. Id. at 212.
27. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951).
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tence of the conspiracy which creates the danger." 281 Both Chief
Judge Learned Hand and Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, in adopting this
version of the "clear and present danger" rule held, by implication,
that the advocacy of the defendants created a clear danger that the
Government of the United States would probably be overthrown by
force and violence. Sensing, but not fully admitting the dilemma, Mr.
Chief Justice Vinson earlier rests his decision on the more proper
and understandable ground that "Overthrow of the Government by
force and violence is certainly a substantial enough interest for the
Government to limit speech."2 9 He tries to escape from the dilemma
by saying that "if the ingredients of the reaction are present, we cannot bind the Government to wait until the catalyst is added." 30 In
short, the opinion, while squinting in the direction of Schenck and its
progeny, and the "clear and present danger" test, actually holds that
Congress has a right and duty to protect the security of the United
States and this right is superior to the right of the petitioners to
advocate violent revolution under the first amendment. The Court
held that sections 2 (a)l, 2 (a)3, and 3 of the Smith Act do not violate
the first amendment. Further, Mr. Chief Justice Vinson holds, contrary
to a prior case,3 1 the question of whether "clear and present danger"
exists is a matter of law for the courts.
After this labored attempt to avoid the effect of the danger test
and still not repudiate it, the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter sweeps through the case like a clean fresh breeze.32 He
makes a powerful, well-reasoned and direct argument for the "balanced
rights" doctrine and rejects the danger theory as inapplicable in the
instant case. He forthrightly recognizes the conflict between the right
"to advocate a political theory" and the right "to safeguard the security of the Nation" and that this conflict cannot be resolved by a
"sonorous formula which is in fact only a euphemistic disguise for
an unresolved conflict." 33 He maintains that the responsibility for
adjusting such conflicts is primarily that of Congress. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter concludes that, in the conflict between national security
and free speech, "Congress has determined that the danger created by
advocacy of overthrow justifies the ensuing restriction on freedom
of speech." 34 He asks: "Can we hold that the First Amendment deprives Congress of what it deemed necessary for the Government's
' ' 35
protection?
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 511.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 511.
Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920).
341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951).
Id. at 519.
Id. at 550.
Id. at 551.
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Mr. Justice Jackson further dears the air by saying, in a concurring opinion, that the danger rule is not applicable. The case
is a conspiracy case and Congress can prohibit people from conspiring to do with others that which they can lawfully do alone. 36
Mr. Justice Black would reverse. He does not believe free speech
can be legally suppressed on the notion of Congress or the Court
as to what is "reasonable." He feels there was bias in the jury and
impropriety in its selection. He also concurs with Mr. Justice Douglas who finds no evidence of seditious conduct. The latter believes the
defendants merely taught from four books on the Marxist doctrine,
which would be lawful in a classroom. Conspiracy, says Mr. Justice
Douglas, cannot turn speech into sedition. He, like Brandeis, advocates
"more speech, not enforced silence" if time permits.
Dennis holds, in brief, that the "danger" in the clear and present
danger test need no longer be imminent. It is enough if Congress
has a reasonable basis for finding that it is probable. And so the
lines are drawn.
The majority holds that if Congress has reasonable cause to place
the security of the United States above certain types of freedom it
may do so without violating the Bill of Rights. The dissenters adhere to the "clear and present danger" rule under which speech and
association can be punishable only if, as a result of the words spoken,
the overthrow by force is imminent.
LIBERTY FIRST OR SAFETY FIRST?

The two legal philosophies involved are free speech absolutism,
on the one hand, and legal justification of the balancing of rights
of national security against the liberty guaranteed by the first amendment, on the other.
The first school is presently headed by Justices Black and Douglas,
usually joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Brennan.
Their views once had the support of Mr. Chief Justice Stone and
Justices Murphy, Rutledge, Jackson, and Roberts. The second was
headed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter until his recent retirement, aided
by Justices Harlan and Clark. Sometimes they were joined by Mr.
Justice Stewart. Previously the school included Mr. Chief Justice
Vinson and Justices Reed, Byrnes, Burton, Whitaker, and Minton.
The philosophy of absolutism is based on the precept that no
speech should be censored in advance. If actionable at all it should
be punished only after utterance as an offense such as libel, slander,
obscenity, or "action" words of incitement leading immediately to
the commission of crime. Mere advocacy should never be punishable.
The right of freedom of expression is an ancient one and deserves, in
36. Id. at 561.
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modern times, a preferred position constitutionally. The basis of the
philosophy is that truth will always prevail if given a free market
place for the exchange of ideas. Granting full, free and fearless discussion, the harmful, the wrong and the untrue will be rejected by an
informed people. Hence Voltaire's famous willingness to lay down
his life for another's right to express an idea detestable to him. Hence
the positions of Montesquieu, Jefferson, Lincoln, Holmes, Brandeis,
Cardozo, Stone and more lately Black, Douglas, and Warren. The
reasoning forces them to the length of protecting advocacy of the
overthrow of the government by the use of force and violence.
The second school supports the Bill of Rights and all the basic
tenets of liberty and due process short of protecting speech that is
likely to endanger the national security. Whether specific speech
may have that effect is something left by the Constitution to the determination of Congress. At this fork in the road, they part company
from the first school. The need for preserving American sovereignty
must be "balanced out" against the guarantees of the first amendment.
The latter must yield to requirements of national security.
In actual practice, however, the real difference is one of approach
to the Communist threat. The "absolutists" believe Communism is
a danger only as an external threat of military force by the Soviet
Union and its satellites, but not as an internal danger. They have
been conditioned by our one-hundred-seventy-year tradition of regarding the long-haired radical, the anarchist, the I.W.W. and the
Socialist and their soapboxes with good-natured tolerance. This accords with the inherited Anglo-Saxon custom of suffering the advocacy
of hanging kings and queens in speech-making in London's Hyde
Park. The "balancers" believe that the international Communist conspiracy exists and has as its purpose the domination of the entire world
by force, and that the American Communist Party should have been
dealt with substantially as Congress has dealt with it.
This is the chart to be used by the legal mariner in sailing the
seas of Supreme Court decisions in dealing with Communist cases of
every kind. There is here no real question of law. It is a question of
fact. Does Communism present an internal menace? With the foregoing discussion in mind, the above digest of Dennis and the following cases with their holdings and dissents become readily understandable.
POST DENNIS CASES
37
The next case of importance was Yates v. United States. The
defendants were indicted for conspiracy to advocate overthrow of

37.

354 U.S. 298 (1957).
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the Government by force and violence and to organize the Communist Party as a society so to advocate, with intent so to do. The
case was submitted to the jury on both the advocating and the organizing charges. The Supreme Court held, by Mr. Justice Harlan,
that to "organize" refers only to the time of first organization, prosecution for which was barred by the three year statute of limitations.
Since it was impossible to determine on which count the jury convicted, the case was reversed as to all, five acquitted and nine ordered
retried. 38
The Court held that the advocacy outlawed was more than mere
speech, and again approved the charge given to the jury in Dennis
that advocacy of action must be by "language reasonably and ordinarily calculated to incite persons to such action." 39 The nine
ordered retried had done more than merely talk; there was evidence
of attendance at classes that taught street-fighting, sabotage, and "moving masses of people in time of crisis.."40
Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, concurs as to
"organize," but would reverse as to all defendants on the ground that
the Smith Act is unconstitutional as contravening the first amendment. He would draw the line between talk and action.
The Yates case represents a slight retreat from the position of the
Dennis case. The principle of Yates means Congress can only "balance out" against advocacy if it is coupled with evil intent and some
effort to instigate action.
On June 5, 1961, ten years after Dennis, three more cases bearing
directly on the points under discussion were decided.
In the first of these, Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,4 the Supreme Court, by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, decided that the Communist Party is a Communist-action
organization required to register with the Attorney General and that
the registration requirements of the Subversive Activities Control
38. The Yates case was also a Smith Act prosecution, but in 1948 the Smith
Act was re-enacted in the general re-codification of the U.S. Criminal Code as 18
U.S.C. §2385, 62 Stat. 808. Section 3 of the Smith Act was not carried into §2385
in 1948, but was, in substance, restored to §2385 in July 1956. 70 Stat. 623. For
convenience the Smith Act and §2385 are referred to throughout this article as "the
Smith Act." See footnote I of the Yates case, 354 U.S. 298, 300, for full text of the
original Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. §2385 and the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C.
§371. Incidentally, the cases against the nine ordered retried were ultimately
dropped without retrial.
39. 354 U.S. 298, 326 (1957). On advocacy, the Court also said: "The distinction
between advocacy of abstract doctrine and advocacy directed at promoting unlawful
action is one that has been consistently recognized in the opinions of this Court
.... "Id. at 318.
40. 354 U.S. 298, 332 (1957).

41. 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
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In deciding the first amendment question, Mr. Justice Frankfurter 4 3 relies squarely on the "balancing out" theory as in Dennis.
Mr. Justice Black dissents in the vigorous language of a devoted
first amendment absolutist and would reverse. He believes the decision bars association merely because it advocates hated ideas. This
is "a fateful moment in the history of a free country"; the constitutional questions ought to be decided now; the act is a bill of attainder
and violates the fifth and first amendments. It is worse than the Alien

42. The proceeding was pursuant to §14 (a) of the Subversive Activities Control
Act, which Act is Title 1 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987, 50
U.S.C. §781 (1952). It was amended in 1954 by 68 Stat. 775, and carried in part
into 8 U.S.C. §§1182, 1251, 1424, and 1451 (1952). There is a full discussion of the
Act in 367 U.S. 1, 4. A summary of the Congressional findings of fact is most relevant to the contentions set forth in this article and is given herewith briefly as
follows: Congress finds there is a world-wide Communist revolutionary movement which seeks through any means to establish a totalitarian dictatorship
throughout the world; the dictatorship would suppress all opposition and all
liberty; the movement is controlled and directed by the "Communist dictatorship of
a foreign country" which uses subservient "action" organizations in each country
which try to carry out the objectives by overthrowing existing governments by
force if necessary. These action organizations are not political parties. They are
elements of the Communist movement and promote their objectives by conspiracy
instead of by democratic processes. They operate on a conspiratorial basis substantially through Communist front organizations. The "most powerful" Communist dictatorship has succeeded in establishing Communist dictatorships in numerous
foreign countries; agents use espionage and sabotage and largely control the Communist network in the United States; international travel is a necessity to the activities; there has been infiltration in the United States by disloyal aliens; many
deportable aliens now in the United States are "free to roam the country"; individuals who participate in the Communist movement in the United States transfer
their allegiance to a foreign country which controls the movement. The Communist movement in the United States numbers thousands of disciplined adherents,
awaiting the moment when the United States, over-extended by foreign engagements, divided within, and in industrial and financial straits might possibly be
overthrown by force and violence; the movement seeks converts here by an "extensive system of schooling and indoctrination." Such methods and organizations
have succeeded elsewhere. The movement, pursuing its objectives with "recent"
(1950) successes elsewhere, and the nature and control of the world Communist
movement itself "present a clear and present danger to the United States" and
to the existence of free American institutions and make it necessary for Congress
to "provide for the common defense" and to preserve the independence of the
United States to enact appropriate legislation. For more details see 367 U.S. 1, 4-8
(1960).
43. 367 U.S. 1, 91 (1961). "To state that individual liberties may be affected
is to establish the condition for, not to arrive at the conclusion of, constitutional
decision. Against the impediments which particular governmental regulation
causes to entire freedom of individual action, there must be weighed the value
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and Sedition Acts, 44 and laws like the Smith Act and the Subversive

Activities Control Act "constitute a baseless insult to the patriotism
45
of our people."
Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas also dissent.
Mr. Justice Brennan, "with whom the Chief Justice joins," dissents in
part.
This case draws the line more clearly between the majority of five
who rest on the "balancing out" theory and the minority of four who
would let the truth prevail through free exchange in the market place
of ideas as long as the proselytes of evil confine themselves to speech
and refrain from action.
The second case decided on June 5, 1961, was Scales v. United
States.48 Scales and others were indicted for violation of the memberto the public of the ends which the regulation may achieve." Mr. Justice Frankfurter refuses to meet the fifth amendment question of self-incrimination until it
arises. Even if parts of the registration act are found to be unconstitutional the
matter would be governed by Electric Bond & Share v. Securities & Exchange
Comm'n, 303 U.S. 419 (1938).
44. 367 U.S. 1, 155 (1961). The so-called Alien and Sedition Acts were enacted
in 1798: 1 Stat. 570; 1 Stat. 577; 1 Stat. 596. The Sedition Act of July 14, 1798,
was directed at two types of conduct. Section 1 made it a criminal offense to
conspire "to impede the operation of any laws of the United States," and to "counsel, advise or attempt to procure any insurrection, riot, unlawful assembly, or
combination." Section 2 provided:
"That if any person shall write, print, utter or publish, or shall cause or
procure to be written, printed, uttered or published, or shall knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering or publishing any false, scandalous
and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States, or
either house of the Congress of the United States, or the President of the United
States, with intent to defame the said government, or the said President, or to
bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against
them, or either or any of them, the hatred of the good people of the United States,
or to stir up sedition within the United States, or to excite any unlawful combination therein, for opposing or resisting any law of the United States, or any act
of the President of the United States, done in pursuance of any such law, or of
the powers in him vested by the constitution of the United States, or to resist,
oppose, or defeat any such law or act, or to aid, encourage or abet any hostile
designs of any foreign nation against the United States, their people or government,
then such person, being thereof convicted before any court of the United States
having jurisdiction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand
dollars, and by imprisonment not exceeding two years." I Stat. 596-97.
45. 367 U.S. 1, 167 (1961). "I would reverse this case and leave the Communists
free to advocate their beliefs in proletarian dictatorship publicly and openly among
the people of this country with full confidence that the people will remain loyal
to any democratic Government truly dedicated to freedom and justice - the kind
of Government which some of us still think of as being 'the last best hope of
earth.'" Id. at 169.
46. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
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ship clause of the Smith Act. 47 A somewhat overlapping provision
of the Internal Security Act of 195048 provides that membership per

se is not a crime. Scales holds, by Mr. Justice Harlan, that there must
be knowledge of existing illegal party purposes and, in addition, active
and purposive participation in the organization's criminal ends. The
Internal Security Act is not intended to repeal the membership clause
of the Smith Act. Guilt is personal but guilt by complicity is possible.
The proscribed activity is unprotected by the first amendment but is
governed by the "clear and present danger" rule. Speech may be used
to effect substantive evils that Congress can legally prevent. In this
case the Yates requirement of strict proof of advocacy of action is met.
The defendant trained people for action and prepared personally for
overt efforts to exploit the Negro "nation" and the working classes.
Such trial errors as existed were not substantial enough to require
reversal.
Mr. Justice Black dissents, holding that the Internal Security Act
bars prosecutions under the membership clause of the Smith Act.
Also, the first amendment bars outlawing of political parties because
of philosophical tenets of overthrow at some distant time. Recent
cases have "balanced away" protections of the first amendment. The
question now is not whether there was an abridgement but whether
Congress believes the interest of the Government requires the abridgment. This theory might cover literally anything the Government
seeks to do.
Mr. Justice Brennan, "with whom the Chief Justice and Mr.
Justice Douglas join," dissents. In his view the 1950 Act suspends the
membership clause of the Smith Act and protects registrants from
prosecution thereunder.
The Scales case follows the previous line-up of the Court. The
"balancers" would convict; the "absolutists" would acquit.
The third case decided on June 5, 1961, was Noto v. United
States.49 It affords an ironic touch to the legal trilogy of Yates, Scales
and Noto. The Supreme Court, by Mr. Justice Harlan, reversed a conviction under the membership clause of the Smith Act on the ground
that the evidence was not sufficient to support a finding that the Communist Party illegally taught and advocated the violent overthrow of
the Government! The opinion draws a parallel to the "infirmity that
we found in the Yates record," but not in Scales. Mere abstract
teaching of theory is not enough to constitute a violation. There
must be strong evidence of a "call to violence now or in the future."5°
47.

18 U.S.C. §2385 (1958).

48. 64 Stat. 987, 50 U.S.C. §781 (1958).
49. 367 U.S. 291 (1961).
50. Id. at 298.
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The Chief Justice and Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan would
remand with directions to dismiss.
As the evidence seemed to show only reading and teaching of
theory without advocacy of action, the case illustrates that the "balancers" and the "absolutists" are not as far apart as the language of
majority and minority opinions in Dennis, Yates, Scales and the other
cases on the subject decided in the last decade would seem to indicate.
CONCLUSION

During the decade since Dennis, the Court usually divided five to
four in cases in which first amendment freedoms and national security
interests have been in opposition. But the position of the self-restraining five, who would yield to Congress in determining what our national security requires, despite the extent of circumscription of liberty,
and the position of the four first amendment absolutists, happily can
be reconciled both in logic and in law.
When there are Congressional findings, based on elaborate investigation, reason and common sense, that the Communists are an
international organization who are determined to seize power over
the entire world by force and violence 5l (and such findings cannot
be lightly disregarded by the Court), it can properly be held that,
in an era of push-button war in which it takes thirty minutes from
any launching site for an ICBM to reach its target in any portion of
the globe, there is a "clear and present danger" that advocacy of the
use of force and violence with evil intent, directed at prompting
unlawful action, may result at any time, and hence immediately, in
bringing about "the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent." If it is a question of "proximity and degree" who can state
with certainty how soon or how great the danger? Interpreting "immediate" to mean "probable" is not unreasonable in such a context.
Viewed in this perspective, Dennis may not be quite as revolutionary as it appears to be. If libelous, blasphemous or obscene language,
or other forms of speech, which Congress finds is inimical per se to
the welfare of the people, can be prohibited, why not the advocacy of
overthrowing the Government by force and violence? Assuming the
restriction is reasonably necessary to the protection of national security and the means used are proper to effectuate a legitimate end,
due process of law has been observed in the exercise of the police
power of the state. To avoid begging the question we must consider
only whether the end is legitimate.
This is a policy matter which the Constitution may well have
left to Congress to decide. The first amendment is not absolute. It
51. Subversive Activities Control Act, Title I of the Internal Security Act of
1950, 64 Stat. 987, 50 U.S.C. §781 (1958).
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prohibits abridging "the freedom of speech," not any speech. It leaves
to Congress the area of definition encompassed by that great field
of Anglo-Saxon liberty known as "the freedom of speech." The words
in quotes are words of art, first developed in the English common law
and since 1787 in American constitutional law.
There is no contrary precedent in either which would forbid
finding that, in the present context of continuing international crises,
specific words, spoken by an advocate of communism with knowledge
of the purpose of the Communist Party, advocating the commission of
the crime of violent overthrow of government should be classed as
prohibited action. The words, in such relation, are more than speech;
they are also acts that Congress could find to be malum in se.
The "clear and present danger" doctrine has no realistic application to the situation. That test is based on whether the acts, which
are in the form of speech, come sufficiently near to the crime intended
to constitute an attempted crime. In the Smith Act, Congress, in effect,
decreed that advocacy of violent overthrow, within the area proscribed by the Smith Act, is a form of anti-patriotic obscenity. This
is not a matter of "proximity or degree." The prohibition falls
within the established non-absolute area of the first amendment.
The power of Congress to determine what acts, in the form of
speech, may be prohibited is circumscribed only by the necessities of
the general welfare and the propriety of means used to protect that
welfare. The limitation in this field is the same as in any other
"due process" problem.
In the long line of cases from Schenck to Dennis the issues dealt
with the free expression by legitimate means of competing ideas. This
distinction is the best justification of the Dennis case. The attempted
interchange of ideas in that case was not by legitimate means but
was in furtherance of an illegal conspiracy. If this major premise is

accepted, Dennis is merely the logical conclusion which must follow.
In short, as Mr. Justice Jackson said, the case was a conspiracy case.
Overshadowed by the possibility of nuclear warfare, the "clear
and present danger" doctrine seems more of a "literary phrase," as Mr.
Justice Frankfurter said in Pennekamp v. Florida,2 than a judicial
approach to the requirements of the safeguarding of national security.
In a "hot" war many constitutional rights are circumscribed by
the paramount necessity of preserving sovereignty. Dennis merely
high-lights the need to do the same in a "cold" war in a missile world.
Nor is Dennis a complete rejection of the "clear and present
danger" rule, which still has validity when the words are not themselves prohibited and when the question is solely whether these words,

52.

328 U.S. 331, 353 (1946).
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in their substance and context, would come reasonably near effecting
the commission of a crime.
Our Bill of Rights has always impaled us on the horns of the
dilemma presented by the Gordian knotty problem of what to do
about "freedom for those who would destroy our freedom." One
horn is security with repression; the other horn is liberty with danger.
Perhaps it is just as well that Dennis cut the Gordian knot. By
protecting ourselves practically in a power world from our own citizens and residents who would aid foreign powers to conquer us we
can best perpetuate a last forum and haven for those who would
53
peacably discuss the philosophy of revolution.
Dennis may not be a menace after all!

53. The classic statement of the creed of political freedom is from Jefferson's
inaugural address in 1800: "If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve
this Union or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is
left free to combat it."
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